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The Body Politic in the Social and Political Thought of Christine 
de Pizan (Abridged Version).  
Part II: Social Inequality and Social Justice1  
 
 
Abstract: Just as Christine de Pizan’s political theory sought to reconcile the need for 
inequality and deference within the political order with the ideals of reciprocity and 
mutuality, so her broader social theory was very like that of earlier thinkers in stressing the 
need for each group within the existing social hierarchy to perform its own particular 
functions for the good of the body politic as a whole. This social outlook was implicitly based 
on the Aristotelian notion of “distributive justice” which argues that while all members of 
society are entitled to receive their proper due, this due is itself profoundly unequal, being 
determined by the hierarchical status of each particular social group. Where Christine’s 
outlook was most original was in its insistence on women’s intelligence and virtue and in the 
artistic means by which she was able to present afresh to her audience ideas about society 
with which they were already very familiar. 
 
Résumé : La pensée politique de Christine de Pizan, qui s’efforçait de concilier la nécessité 
de l’inégalité et de la déférence dans l’ordre politique avec les idéaux de la réciprocité et de 
la solidarité, va de pair avec sa pensée sur la société en général qui, renouant avec celle de 
ses prédécesseurs, insiste sur le devoir de chaque membre de la hiérarchie sociale en vigueur 
de jouer son propre rôle afin d’assurer le bon fonctionnement du corps de policie en son 
entier. Cette pensée en matière de société se calquerait implicitement sur l’idée 
aristotélicienne de la « justice distributive », idée selon laquelle tous les membres de la 
société ont droit à leur propre part, mais que cette part est elle-même profondément inégale 
car elle dépend du statut hiérarchique de chaque groupe social en question. Là où la pensée 
de Christine se révèle vraiment originale c’est plutôt dans l’importance qu’elle accorde à 
l’intelligence et à la vertu des femmes ainsi que dans les moyens discursifs dont elle s’est 
servie afin de renouveler à l’intention de son lectorat des idées qui leur étaient déjà assez 
familières. 
 
Christine’s Social Theory 
The social orders: reciprocity and hierarchy  
Part One of this article argued that although many scholars have emphasised the 
originality and inclusivity of Christine de Pizan’s political outlook, her political theory 
was actually, in offering an account of the body politic in terms of both reciprocity and 
inequality, very similar in its basic principles (and even in much of its detail) to that 
                                                
1 Part I of this article appeared in the previous issue of the CRMH. A longer version of the text 
of this article, which includes more detailed references to the primary sources and to the 
secondary literature, also appears in the electronic version of this journal. References to works 
which are given in full in Part I are given in abbreviated form in Part II, below. 
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found in the works of earlier political philosophers, such as John of Salisbury and Giles 
of Rome, with which she was familiar. However, as we shall see below, Christine’s 
conception of political life was, in turn, only one expression of a much broader social 
outlook, one which, like her political philosophy, combined the ideals of unity and 
mutuality within society with the need for hierarchy and deference. To what extent did 
Christine’s social theory, in particular her account of the worth and social role of 
particular estates, including the peasants, nobles, townspeople, clergy and women, 
differ from that of earlier thinkers? How was she able to reconcile a belief in social 
equity and justice with the need for hierarchy and obedience? 
In many ways, Christine’s social outlook was an extremely traditional one, 
being based on the principle that everyone within society should work hard at their 
calling for the good of the whole. Like the members of a body, each estate had the 
responsibility to carry out its “own part” for the common good so that “nobles do as 
nobles should” and “the populace does as is appropriate for them”, each serving in 
“whatever office God has placed them”, the clergy pursuing their studies and 
performing divine service, the merchants attending “to their merchandise, the artisan 
to their craft [and] the labourers to the cultivation of the earth”, this latter task being 
the “most necessary” of any of the members of the body politic (BBP/LCP: I: 10-11; 
II: 1; III: 8; III: 10). Once society was organised in this way, “everything will be in 
its proper place, without anything encroaching unreasonably upon anything else” 
(BP: II: 1; III: 10, 40). Like Gerson in his sermon Vivat Rex, Christine followed 
Boethius in citing the divinely-ordained harmony of the universe, with its “good 
proportion, concord and peace”, as a model for the love that should exist within 
human communities (BP: III: 2, 6, 9).2 As a result, while people should not seek to 
rise above their station in life, neither should they be degraded below it. Rather the 
estates are “honoured” when they are maintained “in their degree”. Accordingly, 
rather than seeing labour and toil as simply a punishment with which mankind had 
been cursed after its expulsion from Paradise (Genesis 3: 17), Christine taught that 
the office of labour was “acceptable” to God. Even before the Fall, God had put 
Adam in the Garden of Eden “to work, cultivate and take care of it” (Genesis 2: 15) 
whilst many of the Old Testament patriarchs were “cultivators of the earth and 
shepherds of beasts”. (BBP/LCP: I: 1; III: 1; III: 8-10; MF: 4071-4128, 5131-6580; 
BP: III, 2, 6, 9). Of course, Christine’s emphasis on the need to respect each estate 
so long as it performed its function for the social whole was hardly new, having long 
been the basis of medieval social theory.3 As John of Salisbury had said, it is wrong 
to despise the poor and the enslaved since “the whole race of men upon the earth 
arose from the same origin, consists of and is sustained by the same elements, draws 
the same breath from the same source, delights in the same heavens, lives the same, 
and dies the same” whilst, in general, “the road to salvation is safest for whoever is 
free of riches and other material possessions” (Pol: VIII: 12 (p. 183). 
                                                
2 Boethius, “The Consolation of Philosophy”, The Theological Tractates and The Consolation of 
Philosophy, ed. H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand and S. J. Tester, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University 
Press, 1978, Book II, m. 8; Jean Gerson, “Pour la réforme du royaume”, p. 1149; Rigby, Wisdom 
and Chivalry, p. 245-69. 
3 Duby, The Three Orders, passim. 
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The ordered hierarchy which was Christine’s social ideal was, as we have 
seen, exactly the model of social organisation which the organic analogy, with its 
equation of the rightful structure of society with the naturally-given, hierarchical 
ordering of the human body, was traditionally supposed to convey. Thus, it was not 
particularly significant that Christine’s equation of particular orders of society with 
specific bodily members sometimes diverged from that of other medieval thinkers, 
amongst whom there was certainly no unanimity on such matters.4 After all, 
Christine’s own accounts of the body politic themselves differ from text to text in 
terms of the details of which estate should be associated with which particular 
bodily limb or member. For instance, while her Livre du corps de policie equates the 
arms and hands of the body with the nobles and knights, and likens the burghers and 
the merchants to its belly, her Livre de paix compares the lords to the shoulders and 
upper parts of the body, the knights to the arms, the loins and belly to the burghers, 
and the merchants to the thighs: only the parallel of the prince with the head and of 
the common people with the legs and feet remained the same in both works 
(BBP/LCP: I: 1; II: 1; III: 1; III: 9; BP: III: 6).The detail of such differences was not 
particularly important since the main purpose of the organic analogy was not 
empirical description but normative prescription. The metaphor of the body politic 
was not intended to illustrate how society was actually structured but rather to teach 
a lesson about the basic principles by which it should ideally be arranged and, in 
particular, about the need to combine a reciprocal interdependence of the body’s 
members with the hierarchical subordination of the lower to the higher members if 
the health of the whole was to be maintained. 
However, while Christine saw an inequality of “degree” as being essential to 
a stable polity, she also recognised that Christ’s teaching that the kingdom of heaven 
belongs to the poor, who are blessed “in spirit”, and his claim that “a rich man can 
no more enter paradise than a laden camel can go through the eye of a needle” 
(Matthew 5: 3; 19: 24) could be interpreted as a critique of such inequality and of 
the privileges enjoyed by the rich and powerful. Anticipating this objection, 
Christine responded that Christ’s words did not mean that it was impossible for the 
rich person to be saved but rather that they applied only to the “person who has 
riches without virtues and who does not distribute his riches in alms and in good 
deeds”. If someone is virtuous, he or she becomes “poor of spirit and will possess 
the Kingdom of Heaven”. After all, Christine argued, was there not a “great host of 
kings and princes in heaven”, such as St Louis of France, who had enjoyed wealth, 
honour and power in this world? “At every level of society, anyone who wants can 
be saved for the rank does not cause damnation but rather not knowing how to use it 
wisely”. Therefore, Christine did not teach that wealth “can be obtained only at the 
                                                
4 See, for instance, the different social groups which are compared to the eyes of the body 
politic in “The Descryvyng of Mannes Membres”, Twenty-Six Political and Other Poems From 
the Oxford MSS, Digby 102 and Douce 322, Part I, ed. J. Kail, Early English Text Society, o.s., 
124, 1904, l. 9-16 (p. 64); Sherman, Imaging Aristotle, p. 216-17; Gerson, “Pour la réforme du 
royaume”, p. 1145; Lewis, Later Medieval France, p.127; The Sermons of Thomas Brinton, 
Bishop of Rochester, 1373-1389, ed. M. A. Devlin, 2 volumes, Camden Society, Third Series, 85, 
86, 1954, Volume I, p. xxiii, 111; G. Constable, Three Studies in Medieval Religious and Social 
Thought, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 319. 
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expense of others” or claim that possessing worldly riches renders salvation 
inherently problematic but rather condemned those who love such riches 
excessively.5 Christine thus took the current structure of society for granted. 
Accordingly, she urged peasant women to remind their husbands that when they are 
working for someone else, they should labour “as well and as faithfully as if they 
were doing it for themselves”. They should not defraud their masters when they pay 
their rents, cut down timber from somebody else’s forest without permission or 
deceive their masters about their rightful pay since if they do such things “they will 
be damned”. Similarly, while noblewomen should be compassionate to the poor, 
they should also ensure, when supervising their estates, that they are not tricked by 
their tenants and labourers but should supervise their workers so that they do not 
slacken, whilst in the winter-time they should take advantage of the fact that labour 
is less in demand and so “is cheap”. For Christine, social unity could be achieved, 
despite the social divisions created by the diversity of ranks and of occupations, by 
the rich supporting the poor through bearing their share of taxation and through 
giving charity to the needy, and by the labourers working truly to support the body 
politic of which they were the feet. While recommending charity on the part of the 
rich, she also enjoined patience on the part of those who suffer poverty, hunger and 
misery on Earth so that they may achieve the joy of salvation in the next world 
where they would “lack for nothing” (TCL: I: 3; I: 5-6; I: 9; I: 11; I: 16; I: 18; I: 22; 
II: 10; III: 1; III: 3; III: 12-13; LTV: I: 4; I: 6-7; I: 10; I: 12; I: 17; I: 19; I: 23; II: 10; 
III: 1; III: 3; III: 12-13; BP: III: 26, 45). As Christine had argued in Boethian fashion 
in her Livre de l’advision Cristine, our sufferings and sorrows are actually blessings 
in disguise since through them we acquire self-knowledge and are helped on the 
path to eternal happiness (LAC/VCP: III: 15-26). Once more, for Christine, the 
virtues of reciprocity and interdependence within society also went hand in hand 
with the need for inequality and hierarchy as part of the order that God has 
established within the world. 
Indeed, Christine not only argues that members of the nobility can achieve 
salvation but, at times, even seems to argue for their moral superiority. In the Livre 
de paix, Christine began from the orthodox Christian premise that all humans are 
“equal in terms of creation and birth” and that it is better to be humble but virtuous 
than to be of noble birth and yet act basely. Nevertheless, she then went on to argue, 
as had Giles of Rome, that, in fact, God has willed that there should be those marked 
out by their noble lineage amongst whom “by long habit of difference in rank, the 
practice of a distinct kind of greatness of spirit from that found in others becomes 
second nature. Or it should do so, for those who fail in this regard dishonour their 
ancestry. This is shown by the beasts and birds: some are noble and others not” 
(GKP: 280-2; 333: LGR: 261-3; 310; BP: III: 10). Thus while elsewhere, depending 
upon her immediate didactic and rhetorical aims, Christine highlighted the goodness 
of the (humble) poor or the reasonableness of the middle classes, when defending 
                                                
5 S. J. Dudash, “Christine de Pizan’s Views of the Third Estate”, Contexts and Continuities: 
Proceedings of the IVth International Colloquium on Christine de Pizan (Glasgow, 21-27 
July, 2000) Published in Honour of Liliane Dulac, ed. A. J. Kennedy, R. Brown-Grant, J. C. 
Laidlaw and C. M. Müller, 3 volumes, Glasgow, University of Glasgow Press, 2002, Volume 
II, p. 315-30, at p. 320; Dudash, “Christine de Pizan and the ‘menu people’”, p. 806. 
The Body Politic in the Social and Political Thought of Christine 
 
563 
the privileges of the nobility, she presents this group as possessing a superior 
“greatness of spirit”. As a result of this superiority, the other social orders should 
defer to them, being “humble” beneath the rule of their superiors and working hard 
in their estate (BP: II: 1; III: 10, 40). Doubtless, when selecting a constable to lead 
his army, a king should pay more attention to a man’s skill at arms and character 
than to his lineage or blood but, nevertheless, “if both were found in the same 
person, it would be very useful” since “the nobler the blood, the greater the esteem 
in which he would be held … a quality necessary to every leader” (BDAC: I: VII (p. 
24)). Similarly, in her plea to Queen Isabeau to act as a mediator in France’s civil 
strife, Christine again takes for granted the moral superiority of those of noble blood 
when she argues that if pity, charity and clemency are virtues natural to women, 
“they must reasonably be the more abundant in a noble lady” (ERF: 76). 
The crux of the traditional case by which the nobility’s high status was 
justified was their chivalric role in defending the community in time of war. By 
contrast, in bemoaning the miseries suffered by a France torn apart by civil war in 
the Lamentacion sur les maux de la France, Christine has been seen as offering a 
“radical redefinition” of the chivalric concepts of victory, glory and renown as they 
relate to the estate of the “chevaliers”, as questioning the contemporary “system of 
masculine values” and as concluding that “every form of war contradicts divine 
will”.6 Yet while Christine certainly lamented the failure of the nobles to live up to 
their own chivalric ideals in the context of a civil war in which they treated their 
fellow countrymen as “mortal enemies”, she did not necessarily reject these ideals 
per se (LMF: 180-5; LWF: 304-8). Thus, in her Livre de l’advision Cristine and in 
her Livre des fais d’armes et de la chevalerie, a manual of the art of warfare written 
around the same time as the Lamentacion, Christine offers a traditional medieval 
defence of the just war and explicitly argues that while warfare often involves many 
great wrongs, nonetheless “wars undertaken for a just cause are permitted by God” 
who is the “Lord and Governor of Hosts and battles”.7 When crimes are committed 
in time of war, they are not, therefore, the product of war in itself but are rather the 
outcome of the “misuse” of war by men of evil will. Princes are not only allowed to 
wage war so as to maintain law and justice but rather, since war is sometimes an 
appropriate means for “the proper execution of justice”, are positively “obliged to do 
so” (BCAD: I: II (p. 14); I: IV (p. 16-17); III: III (p. 146); III: XIII (p. 163); 
LAC/VCP: II: 19). As Christine argues in her Livre de paix, whilst peace, 
particularly internal peace as opposed to the madness of civil war, may be the most 
delightful and joyful thing in the world, nevertheless the prince, like Charles V, must 
be prepared for battle and know how to “carry on his wars well” (BP: II: 1-2; I: 10; 
II: 17; III: 3; III: 13-14). If Christine believed in peace then it was peace through 
strength. Indeed, far from questioning “masculine” values, her Livre du corps de 
                                                
6 M. Zimmermann, “Vox Femina, Vox Politica: The Lamentacion sur les maux de la France”, 
Politics, Gender and Genre: The Political Theory of Christine de Pizan, ed. M. Brabant, Boulder, 
Westview, 1992, p. 113-27, at p. 125. 
7 For references on the just war, see J. Barnes, “The Just War”, The Cambridge History of Later 
Medieval Philosophy: from the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, ed. 
N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 771-
84. 
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policie cites, as a cautionary tale about the consequences of luxury, the example of 
the King of Persia who subjugated the people of Lydia by giving them a life of ease 
so that instead of being “powerful and brave in arms”, they became “as soft and 
dainty as women”. Rather than rejecting all forms of war, Christine argued that the 
pursuit of arms and chivalry, which is the estate duty of the nobles in their capacity 
as the “arms and hands of the body politic”, is a “most honourable office”, one for 
which they should honoured and rewarded and which would allow them to obtain a 
place in Paradise (BCAD I: I (p. 12); I: IX (p. 29-32); III: I (p. 144); BBP/LCP: I: 1; 
I: 28-29; II: 2-21; CB: LXIV; EPVH: III, IX). 
Some scholars have seen Christine’s view of the body politic as being more 
comprehensive than that of John of Salisbury and Giles of Rome in its inclusion of 
the classes of merchants and labourers or have argued that Christine’s view that 
increasing the wealth of a country was one of the duties of the ruler was part of a 
“new ideal” of kingship, one which contrasts with that of earlier political theorists 
who saw the ruler’s functions as “promoting moral and political rectitude” and 
seeking the eternal salvation of himself and his subjects.8 Yet, in fact, while it is true 
that townspeople are not explicitly included in the description of the body politic in 
those passages which John of Salisbury claimed to have taken from Plutarch, 
elsewhere in the Policraticus he shows himself to be well aware of the existence of 
townspeople, artisans and traders, including textile-, wood- and metal-workers, from 
which “the corporate community of the republic derives benefit” (Pol: VI: 2 (p. 110-
11); VI: 20 (p. 126)). Similarly, Giles of Rome had extolled the virtues of the 
division of labour between particular industries and between different towns, with 
trade and money facilitating such specialisation, as one of the means of meeting the 
needs of the community, and had taught that the ruler had a duty to ensure the 
provision of material necessities for his subjects (GKP: 59, 160-3, 169, 265-7, 323-
4, 336-9, 383-4; LGR: 145-8, 245-7, 298-300, 314-9, 361-3). Indeed, one of the 
chief advantages of the metaphor of the body politic over the traditional medieval 
division of society into those who pray, those who fight and those who work was 
that it allowed for the existence of a wider variety of status-groups, professions and 
occupations than the traditional tripartite conception while still preaching a similar 
message about the need for both hierarchy and interdependence within society. 
Thus, far from Christine having challenged the “simplicity” or “naïveté” of medieval 
thought about the things of this world, her view of material prosperity and profit as 
being goals worthy of pursuit within a “complex and diverse social and economic 
order” fitted harmoniously within the mainstream of medieval thought, as 
represented by churchmen such as Aquinas and Giles of Rome, with its Aristotelian 
                                                
8 Carroll, “On the Causes of War and the Quest for Peace”, p. 344-6; Carroll, “Christine de Pizan 
and the Origins of Peace Theory”, p. 31; R. Blumenfeld Kosinski, “‘Enemies Within/Enemies 
Without’: Threats to the Body Politic in Christine de Pizan”, Medievalia et Humanistica, 26, 
1999, p. 1-15, at p. 3; Nederman, “The Expanding Body Politic”, p. 389-90, 397; Delogu, 
Theorizing the Ideal Sovereign, p. 158-9, 182-3. 
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view of humans as social and political animals (GKP: 13, 59, 98, 161-4, 176, 226, 
289-94, 383-4; LGR: 10, 86-7, 145-50, 152, 203, 269-73, 361-2).9 
If Christine’s views about the need for rulers to promote the material 
prosperity of their subjects did not distinguish her from earlier political theorists 
then how original was her account of the place of the clergy within the body politic? 
Did she, as some scholars have argued, develop the organic analogy in a “noticeably 
anti-clerical” way in abandoning John of Salisbury’s equation of the clergy in the 
Policraticus with the “soul” of the body (Pol: V: 2 (p. 67)), in allowing the king to 
adopt a “corrective role” in relation to sinful clerics, in disregarding the Church’s 
claims for its supremacy over the temporal power, and in adopting a more secular 
outlook than John of Salisbury for whom the purpose of life and of society was 
“essentially religious”?10 It is certainly true that Christine did not follow John of 
Salisbury in drawing a parallel between the role of the clergy within society and that 
of the soul within the body. Indeed, she argued that, in maintaining the health of the 
kingdom, it is the role of the prince within society – not the Church – that resembles 
the function of the soul in sustaining the body (LFBM: II: 31-2). Yet, Christine’s 
employment of this metaphor here does not necessarily mean that she was adopting 
a more secular attitude than that found in her sources. After all, although John of 
Salisbury had portrayed the clergy as the “soul” of the body politic, even his use of 
the metaphor of the body politic has been seen as secular in its separation of the soul 
from the rest of the body and in his insistence that the prince (the head of the body 
politic) should be “preferred” before the body’s other members (Pol: V: 2 (p. 67); V: 
6 (p. 69)).11 Moreover, in equating the prince with the soul, Christine actually seems 
to be following Giles of Rome who in turn had adopted the analogy from Aristotle. 
Thus, in the De regimine principum, Giles claimed that just as the soul is the 
salvation and life of the body which it rules and holds together, so a rightful king is 
the salvation and life of his realm, although he also likened the primacy of the prince 
within the polity to that of the heart – or alternatively of the head – within the body 
(GKP: 59, 212, 327, 388; LGR: 46, 190, 303, 365).12  
By contrast, in his later De ecclesiastica potestate (1302), written in the 
context of the conflict between Philip IV of France and Pope Boniface VIII, Giles 
was to argue that “royal power should be subject to priestly power”, particularly to 
that of the pope, since rightful kingship was instituted through the priesthood, an 
                                                
9 Nederman, “The Expanding Body Politic”, p. 396-7; Nederman, “The Opposite of Love”, 
p. 181-2; Aristotle, “Politics”, I: 2; Thomas Aquinas, “On Princely Government”, Selected 
Political Writings, ed. A. P. Entrèves, Oxford, Blackwell, 1959, I: 1. 
10 Nederman, “The Living Body Politic”, p. 21-2, 28; Nederman, “Body Politics”, p. 75; 
Nederman, “The Expanding Body Politic”, p. 389; Forhan, “Polycracy, Obligation and Revolt”, 
p. 45; Carroll, “Christine de Pizan and the Origins of Peace Theory”, p. 133; Carroll, “On the 
Causes of War and the Quest for Peace”, p. 344. 
11 Nederman, Medieval Aristotelianism and its Limits, VI: 212; C. J. Nederman, John of 
Salisbury,Tempe, MRTS, 2005, p. 56-7. 
12 Aristotle, “Politics”, I: 5 (p. 16-17), I: 6 (p. 19), VII: 1 (p. 167), VII: 15 (p. 190). Giles also 
follows Aristotle in equating lords with the soul and servants with the body (GKP: 274). See also 
Seneca, “De clementia”, I, iii: 5. 
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office which predated and was superior to that of kings.13 When judged by the 
standards of the De ecclesiastica potestate – if not those of the De regimine 
principum, which fails to make any mention of the role of the clergy within the body 
politic – Christine was certainly far less hierocratic in her outlook than Giles. Thus, 
in the Livre du corps de policie, she seems to equate the clergy (along with the 
merchants and burghers) with the belly of the body politic whilst in her Livre de 
paix she presents the clerics as the flanks of the body (with the burghers cast as the 
loins and belly and the merchants as the body’s thighs) and thus as enjoying a less 
principal or honourable place than the nobles (the arms or shoulders), let alone than 
the prince (the head) himself. Indeed, rather than ascribing to the clergy the social 
primacy which they enjoyed in traditional versions of the tripartite theory, the Livre 
du corps de policie explicitly included the clergy (although they are defined here as 
the students of the University of Paris and elsewhere) within the “third estate” of the 
realm, although they did enjoy pride of place within it (BBP/LCP: III: 4). 
Nonetheless, Christine did still regard the clergy as important members of the body 
politic with their position, which included the role of educating the young prince and 
of being devoted to “laws and learning”, being “high, noble and worthy of honour 
amongst the others” (BBP/LCP: I: 4; I: 6-7; I: 10; III: 1; III: 4; BP: II: 1; III: 6). 
It is certainly true that Christine was sometimes critical of the clergy of her 
own day, saying that many of the bishops and priests were “truly devils” and that 
promotion in the church was often granted to those who were guilty of greed and 
luxury (BBP/LCP: I: 7; see, however, BP: III: 6). However, in criticising individual 
clerics, Christine was hardly being anti-clerical since such attacks on the morality of 
the clergy (as opposed to challenging their actual estate-function or privileges) were 
commonplace throughout the Middle Ages, usually being the work of reforming 
clerics themselves.14 Indeed, in comparison with the critique of the clergy, from the 
pope downwards, which John of Salisbury mounted in the Policraticus, where he 
denounces the clergy of his own day as being like the Pharisees whom Christ had 
attacked as wolves in sheep’s clothing (Matthew 7: 15), Christine’s own 
condemnation of immoral clerics is relatively mild (Pol: VI: 24 (p. 133-5); VII: 20-
21 (p. 164-74)). Moreover, despite her criticisms of the clergy, it is problematic to 
claim that Christine wished the prince to adopt a “corrective” role in relation to the 
Church so that, in effect, the priesthood became like a “civil office”.15 In fact, 
Christine explicitly says that “correction [la correction] of people in the church is 
not his [i.e., the good prince’s] to undertake” (BP: I: 7 (p. 13-14); LCP: I: 7 (p. 11)). 
Certainly, in principle, French clergymen of this period were “immune from lay 
jurisdiction” even in criminal cases and, at their coronations, French kings swore to 
uphold clerical liberties and immunities although, in practice, Charles V himself, 
despite his personal piety, was keen to maintain the royal prerogative against the 
                                                
13 Giles of Rome’s On Ecclesiastical Power, ed. Dyson, p. 23-5, 29-37, 101-2, 131, 137-9, 205-7, 
217-19, 277-85, 291-3, 381-91. 
14 Owst, Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England, p. 242-86; Lewis, Later Medieval France, 
p. 292-5, 304-6. 
15 Nederman, “Body Politics”, p. 75. 
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Church’s temporal claims.16 Christine herself praised the “very true Christian” and 
“very devout and catholic” Charles V for “respecting the clergy’s rights and 
privileges” as part of his achievement in bringing order and happiness to the realm 
(LFBM I: 94; BP: I: 6; III: 22). Yet, while explicitly defending the rights of the 
Church, Christine, as so often, was also able to have it both ways. As she says, if the 
king did not enjoy the de jure right to “correct” the clergy then, in practice, he did 
have a de facto ability to take them to task since, when confronted with the authority 
of the ruler, no prelate or cleric is “so great that he will dare withstand or complain” 
about him if his prince “reproves him [le reprent] for his manifest sin or vice” 
(BBP/LCP: I; 7). 
What is perhaps most striking in Christine’s discussion of the role of the 
clergy within the body politic is its abstraction and consequent failure to engage 
with the sharp controversies of the day about the role of the Gallican Church and of 
the papacy within the body politic. Thus, while it was easy to be in favour of 
defending the liberties of the Church in general, it was more difficult to specify what 
the liberties of the French Church actually were, either in relation to the Crown (for 
instance, its liability to royal taxation) or to the papacy (such as the extent of the 
pope’s right of provision to benefices in France and his ability to tax the French 
Church). Such questions had been a source of conflict since the thirteenth century 
but became particularly marked after the start of the Great Schism in 1378. Indeed, 
in 1398, the French Church had, in effect, declared its autonomy from the papacy 
when it renounced its obedience to the Avignon pope, Benedict XIII, a decision 
overturned in 1403 but then renewed in February 1407.17 Yet, although Christine 
seems to have been writing the Livre du corps de policie in 1406-7, she makes no 
mention of these debates. Nevertheless, if Christine devoted little attention to the 
role of the Church within the body politic, this does not mean that she had adopted a 
new, secular outlook. On the contrary, just as John of Salisbury had attacked the 
glories and riches of this world as filth when they became impediments to salvation 
(Pol: V: 11 (p. 94); V: 17 (p. 101); VIII: 16 (p. 189-90); VIII: 17 (p. 196)) and Giles 
of Rome had stressed that earthly fame and wealth were insignificant when 
compared to the fate of one’s immortal soul (GKP: 24, 28-9; LGR: 20, 22-4) so 
Christine urged the prince to learn that “the grandeur of lordship” is only transitory, 
that worldly goods and honours are short-lived, and that one day he will have to 
account for his deeds, on peril of losing eternal salvation (BBP/LCP: I: 6-7). 
Given Christine’s modern fame for her systematic defence of women against 
their clerkly detractors, it is not surprising to find that, while in many respects she 
herself was an Aristotelian in her metaphysics and her political theory, where she 
diverged most radically from the Philosopher and his medieval followers was on the 
                                                
16 Lewis, Later Medieval France, p. 170-2, 307; The Coronation Book of Charles V of France, ed. 
E. S. Dewick, Henry Bradshaw Society, 16, London, Harrison and Sons, 1899, p. 118-19; C.R. 
Sherman, The Portraits of Charles V of France, New York, New York University Press, 1969, 
p. 8, 13-14; C. F. O’Meara, Monarchy and Consent: the Coronation Book of Charles V of 
France, London, Harvey Miller, 2001, p. 39. 
17 Lewis, Later Medieval France, p. 289-327; H. Kaminsky, “The Great Schism”, The New 
Cambridge Medieval History, Volume VI, c.1300-c.1415, ed. M. Jones, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000, p. 674-96, at p. 686-92. 
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issue of women’s intelligence, rationality and ability to exercise political authority. 
Aristotle himself had taught that “the male is by nature fitter for command than the 
female, just as the elder and full-grown is superior to the younger and more 
immature”. Thus, while both men and women can achieve a moral excellence, for 
instance by being courageous, “the courage of a man is shown in commanding, of a 
woman in obeying”.18 In this perspective, women were regarded as unsuitable for the 
exercise of political power. As Giles of Rome argued, women’s lesser reason meant 
that they should be obedient to their husbands who were their “masters” and “lords” 
(GKP: 192-209, 275; LGR: 162-86, 253). Similarly, John of Salisbury took it for 
granted that men were the “noble sex” and women the “weaker” one and so warned 
against the “rulership of women and the effeminate” (Pol: V: 10 (p. 90); VI: 22 (p. 
131). VII: 25 (p. 176)). Even Nicole Oresme, who taught that men’s superiority did 
not mean that women were inherently bad but simply that they were “less good”, 
still argued against the succession of women to the throne, citing the polity of the 
Amazons, with its female rulers, as a thing contrary to nature, “une chose hors 
nature”.19 
Christine, of course, adopted a very different position, arguing that women’s 
minds were just as sharp as men’s, that they were just as able to distinguish between 
right and wrong, and that they were perfectly capable of understanding the law and, 
indeed, of excelling in even more demanding disciplines. As a result, women were 
certainly able to “govern wisely” and to “establish good customs”. She cited many 
examples of women who mastered these arts such as the Empress Nicaula, ruler of 
Arabia, Egypt and Ethiopia, who governed her lands with “exemplary skill” and 
“established just laws by which to rule her people”, not to mention the many 
noblewomen who had ruled their territories or estates with prudence and justice. 
Similarly, while accepting that women were not, in general, as strong and 
courageous as men, Christine cited many examples of individual women whose 
“courage, strength and bravery” matched those of men, including the Amazons 
whose military prowess meant that they were feared by the Greeks more than any 
other race in the world (BCL/CD: I: 11; I: 13-26; I: 43). Certainly, given her own 
desire to offer counsel to the Dauphin in works such as the Livre de paix, Christine 
could hardly do otherwise than claim a right for women to speak out on political 
matters, a right which she explicitly asserts, via her use of the humility topos, at the 
opening to the Livre du corps de policie (BBP/LCP: I: 1). Indeed, the illustrations in 
the manuscripts to her Epistre Othea (originally written around 1400) seem to 
equate Othea, the goddess of wisdom who teaches virtue to the fifteen-year-old 
Hector, with Christine herself.20  
Traditionally, mirrors for princes had neglected the part played by women in 
political life (although this is also true of Christine’s own Livre du corps de policie) 
but a positive public role for women was available to Christine from the scriptures, 
chronicles and imaginative literature: that of the merciful intercessor. Following the 
                                                
18 Aristotle, “Politics”, I: 12-13.  
19 Maistre Nicole Oresme, Le livre de politiques d’Aristote. Published from the text of Avranches 
Manuscript 223, ed. A. D. Menut. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, n.s. 60/6, 
1970, p. 53, 155-60. 
20 Hindman, Christine de Pizan’s Epistre Othéa, p. 42-5, 48, 59. 
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models of the Virgin Mary and the Old Testament Esther – both of whom Christine 
herself invoked (ERF: 76, 78) – real and fictional queens had traditionally been cast 
in this role, as when Froissart famously portrayed Queen Philippa throwing herself 
on her knees before Edward III on behalf of the six burghers of Calais in 1347.21 
Even Giles of Rome, who was able to find very few positive things to say about the 
female sex, regarded women as capable of providing a model for male rulers in their 
tendency to be tender-hearted and merciful to others (GKP: 198-9; LGR: 173). 
Given Christine’s view of men as being “more hot-headed” and more vengeful than 
women, and so as being more ready to go to war, and her claim that women were 
“by nature more timid and also of a sweeter disposition” than men, it was natural for 
her to cast women in the role of peacemakers. Thus, while she did call upon men to 
act to bring peace to the realm, she nonetheless presented women’s gentle nature as 
“the best means of pacifying men”. Her Livre des trois vertus therefore urged the 
princess to mediate between the prince and his enemies and to reconcile him to those 
with whom he had come into conflict, whether this be foreign powers, his own 
barons, or his “rebellious people” (LMF: 182-5; BP: I: 2; II: 2; TCL: I: 8; II: 9; 
LTV: I: 9; II: 9). 
Christine also saw women’s intelligence and virtue as being demonstrated in 
their role as deputies during the absence of their husbands or as widows who acted 
as regents or guardians when their children were minors. As she argued in her Livre 
des trois vertus, a widowed princess with young children is likely to have to mediate 
with the barons of the realm as well as to have to use her wisdom to defend her 
children’s inheritance against the effects of rebellion or foreign invasion (TCL: I: 
21; LTV: I: 22). Her Livre de la cité des dames praises the role of women who ably 
carried out these duties such as Blanche of Castile who, following the death of her 
husband, Louis VIII, in 1226, was regent during the minority of her son, Louis IX, 
and who had ruled France with “such skill and care” until her son was of age “that 
no man could have done better” (BCL/CD: I: 13). As Adams has emphasised, 
Christine’s use of such exempla of female prudence were not simply part of a 
general defence of women. Rather, in the context of Charles VI’s recurrent episodes 
of madness and at a time when his wife, Isabeau of Bavaria, was playing a 
prominent role as a member, and even president, of the council which ruled in his 
place, her arguments also had an immediate and practical political significance.22 
Christine’s Epistre a la royne de France (1405) therefore urges Isabeau to use the 
pity, charity and clemency which were natural to women so as to remedy the ills of 
the kingdom of France, which was being torn apart by the conflict between the 
dukes of Orleans and Burgundy (ERF: 70, 76, 78; see also LMF: 181; LWF: 305-6). 
In fact, as Adams points out, when Christine wrote her letter to Isabeau, the queen 
                                                
21 For references, see Rigby, Wisdom and Chivalry, p. 141-5. 
22 T. Adams, “Notions of Late Medieval Queenship: Christine de Pizan’s Isabeau of Bavaria”, 
The Rule of Women in Early Modern Europe, ed. A. J. Cruz and M. Suzuki, Urbana, 
University of Illinois Press, 2009, p. 13-29 at p. 20-6; T. Adams, “Christine de Pizan, Isabeau 
of Bavaria and Female Regency”, French Historical Studies, 23, 2009, p. 1-32, at p. 3, 17, 20, 24-
32; T. Adams, “Recovering Queen Isabeau: a Rereading of Christine de Pizan’s Une epistre a la 
royne de France (1405) and La lamentacion sur les maux de la guerre civile”, Fifteenth Century 
Studies, 33, 2008, p. 35-55, at p. 42-7. 
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was already active as a peacemaker and almost immediately after Christine’s plea 
was instructed by the king to “continue to serve as mediator in the conflict”.23 Thus, 
if the role which Christine proposed for women as intercessors and mediators was 
far more active than the one which they were usually assigned in works of medieval 
political theory, it did not go beyond that which they already occupied in the reality 
of late medieval political life. 
Similarly, while Christine praised women who acted as regents and took it 
for granted that a princess could be given “great powers to govern” as, for instance, 
the head of a council, she also stressed that this would only be the case during the 
minority of an heir or when the prince himself was occupied elsewhere. Likewise, 
while Christine assumed that noblewomen whose husbands were away at court or on 
campaign would need to know how to run an estate, how to defend her family’s 
landed interests at law and even how to launch attacks or to defend their property 
against military assaults from others, she once more presupposed that they would 
only perform such tasks in the absence of, and on behalf of, their husbands who had 
delegated “the responsibility and authority to govern” to them and that, in so doing, 
they would be guided by the counsel of “wise old men” (TCL: I: 11; II: 9-10; I: 12, 
II: 9-10). Thus, if Christine saw women as men’s equals in terms of their potential to 
act rationally or morally, she did not conclude from these egalitarian premises that, 
in actual practice, the political realm required the input of men and women on an 
“equal footing”.24 Even though women have the ethical capability and intellectual 
qualities needed to be brave warriors or wise rulers, their capabilities would be best 
put to use within their own sphere of life: “It’s not necessary for the public good for 
women to go around doing what men are supposed to do”. Rather God “has 
endowed each sex with qualities and attributes which they need to perform the tasks 
for which they are cut out” (BCL/CD: I: 11; I: 27; II: 7). For instance, “God gave 
men strong, powerful bodies to stride about and to speak boldly, which explains why 
it is men who learn law and maintain the rule of justice”, even though women have 
the innate intelligence to master the law (BCL/CD: I: 11; I: 13; BP: III: 5).25 Thus, 
while Christine’s Ditié de Jehanne d’Arc (1429) did praise a woman for overcoming 
France’s enemies in time of war and cited Joan’s victories as evidence for God’s 
approval of the female sex in general, Christine did not present her as a role model 
whose example should be followed by other women. Rather, she saw Joan as an 
instrument through whom God worked His “miracles”, her status as the heaven-sent 
saviour of the nation being demonstrated precisely by her exceptionality rather than 
                                                
23 T. Adams, “Moyennerresse de traictié de paix: Christine de Pizan’s Mediators”, Healing the 
Body Politic, ed. Green and Mews, p. 177-200, at p. 189-90; T. Adams, “The Political 
Significance of Christine de Pizan’s Third Estate in the Livre du corps de policie”, Journal of 
Medieval History, 35, 2009, p. 385-98, at p. 389; T. Adams, “Isabeau de Bavière et la notion de 
régence chez Christine de Pizan”, Désireuse de plus avant enquerre… Actes du VIe Colloque 
international sur Christine de Pizan, ed. L. Dulac, A. Paupert, C. Reno and B. Ribémont, Paris, 
Honoré Champion, 2008, p. 33-44, at p. 41-4. 
24 T. L. D. Dow, “Christine de Pizan and the Body Politic”, Healing the Body Politic, ed. 
Green and Mews, p. 226-43, at p. 227. 
25 S. H. Rigby, “The Wife of Bath, Christine de Pizan and the Medieval Case for Women”, 
Chaucer Review, 35, 2000-2001, p. 133-65, at p. 137-9. 
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by her social or moral exemplarity (JDA: 97-104, 217-27, 265-6).26 As a result, 
although Christine rejected Aristotle’s specific claims about the intellectual 
inferiority of women, the Philosopher’s more general view of humans as “social 
animals” who survived by specialism and exchange remained the basis of her view 
of the traditional separation of men and women’s social roles (BP: II: 14). Thus, 
while the allegorical “City of Ladies” which Christine constructed as a defence of 
women in the Livre de la cité des dames lacks the class inequalities and the 
specialisation and division of labour which were the foundation of conventional 
medieval visions of the good society, the account of how social reality itself should 
be organised which she offered in the Livre du corps de policie and the Livre des 
trois vertus was based on precisely these principles.27  
 
Social hierarchy and distributive justice  
As we have seen, both Christine’s political theory and her social philosophy 
were premised on the inevitability of inequality and on the desirability of obedience and 
deference on the part of the common people. Thus, despite presenting the “simples 
laboureux” who tilled the earth as the “most necessary” of all the members of the body 
politic, she did not conclude that this indispensability meant that those who fed the rest 
of society should be the most highly rewarded group within it (BBP/LCP: III: 10). 
Instead, Christine argued that it was the nobles and knights who were “wise in 
government and diligent in chivalrous pursuits” to whom the prince particularly owed 
“love, honour and great reward”. Indeed, given that they risked their lives for the public 
good, society would be hard-pressed to reward them sufficiently, however much praise 
or “expensive provisions” they were given (BBP/LCP: I: 29; BP: II: 3). As a result, she 
did not object that nobles received “among the highest and most exalted honours in this 
world” but simply demanded that those who enjoyed such honour should, by their 
deeds, live up to their noble name (BBP/LCP: II: 13). How, then, did Christine justify 
such unequal social and political arrangements? 
In arguing for an unequal allocation of wealth, power and social honour to 
the different social estates, Christine implicitly relied upon the Aristotelian principle 
of “distributive justice”, one with which she was probably familiar from Henri de 
Gauchy’s translation of Giles of Rome’s De regimine principum (DRP: I, ii: x-xi; 
GKP: 54-60; LGR: 43-5) or via Nicole Oresme’s version of Aristotle’s Ethics.28 
Aristotle had explicated various meanings of the word “justice”, one key sense being 
that which is “equal or fair” so that everyone receives his rightful due (a definition 
                                                
26 R. Brown-Grant, “‘Hee! Quel honneur au femenin sexe!’: Female Heroism in Christine de 
Pizan’s Ditié de Jehanne d’Arc”, Journal of the Institute of Romance Studies, 5, 1997, p. 123-
33. 
27 Brabant and Brint, “Identity and Difference in Christine de Pizan’s Cité des dames”, p. 211, 
215; J. L. Kellogg, “The Cité des dames: an Archaeology of the Regendered Body Politic”, 
Contexts and Continuities, ed. Kennedy et al., Volume II, p. 431-41, at p. 438; M. Quilligan, 
The Allegory of Female Authority: Christine de Pizan’s Cité des dames, Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, 1991, p. 195. 
28 Maistre Nicole Oresme: Le livre de ethiques d’Aristote. Published from the Text of MS 
2902, Bibliothèque Royale de Belgique, ed. A. D. Menut, New York, G. E. Stechert, 1940, 
p. 283-4. 
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of justice that came to be particularly associated in the Middle Ages with Cicero), 
whereas injustice is when someone receives too much or too little of that to which 
he is entitled.29 However, this definition of justice simply posed the question of how 
one is to establish what is equal or fair and of how what one is rightly due is to be 
determined. In answering this question, Aristotle had distinguished between various 
types of justice. One, which Aristotle defined as a specific form of “corrective” 
justice and which Aquinas called “commutative justice”, is that involved in 
voluntary exchanges between individuals (or, as Aquinas put it, between the 
separate parts of a whole) such as buying and selling. Here, £10 worth of corn 
should be exchanged for £10 of cloth, there being an equitable quid pro quo or 
“arithmetic” proportionality of things given to things received, and the law treats the 
two parties to the exchange as equals. A second form of justice is that which 
Aristotle called “distributive” justice and which Aquinas defined as dealing with the 
relationship between the whole and its parts since it is concerned with the 
“distribution of a community’s goods to its members”. Here there is not the simple 
equality of commutative exchange. Rather, as Aristotle said, while this form of 
justice requires equality for those who are equals it also involves inequality for those 
who are defined by society as being unequal. In such cases there is a “geometric” 
proportionality between the particular groups of people and the share of society’s 
common goods (such as honour, power and wealth) which is allocated to them. As 
Aristotle put it, “if persons are not equal, they will not have equal shares”. For 
Aquinas, the principle of distributive justice thus required the allocation of a 
community’s goods to its members in proportion to their hierarchical “worth” or 
“status”.30  
Giles of Rome invoked this idea in order to explicate how both the members 
of the human body and the different parts of the body politic should be related. He 
argued that while the individual members of the human body, such as the eye or the 
foot, should exist in a relationship of commutative justice in which each needs the 
services of the others, the continued survival of the body also required that its parts 
should be related in terms of distributive justice. Thus, the heart, as the prime source 
of life, should rule over the rest of the body and impart life and movement to all its 
members according to their hierarchical “dignity”, such hierarchy being 
characteristic of all natural things. Likewise, rightful order within the body politic 
requires the existence of the distributive justice by which rewards are granted to the 
                                                
29 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V, v: 17-18; Cicero, On Duties, I: 15, 17, 20; Augustine, City 
of God, XIX: 21 (p. 882); The Etymologies of Isidore of Seville, ed. S. A. Barney, W. J. Lewis, J. 
A. Beach and O. Berghof, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, II.24.6; Robert of 
Basevorn, “The Form of Preaching”, Three Medieval Rhetorical Acts, ed. J. J. Murphy, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1971, XXXIX.  
30 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V, iii: 1-5; Aristotle, “Politics”, III: 9 (p. 73); III: 12 (p. 79); 
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation, ed. T. McDermott, London, Eyre 
and Spottiswoode, 1989, p. 54, 387-8; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Volume 37: Justice 
(2a2ae. 57-62), ed. T. Gilby, London, Blackfriars, 1975, p. 87-101; Thomas Aquinas, 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 929-76; Oresme, Le livre de ethiques d’Aristote, 
p. 288, 526; Philippe de Mézières, Le songe du vieil pelerin, ed. G. W. Coopland, 2 volumes, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969, 257 (p. 332). 
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members of the community according to their dignity or worth. Giles argued that if 
justice is the virtue which assigns everyone his due then social justice required the 
“proportionate equality”, i.e., the inequality, in which men receive their deserts, in 
terms of wealth, honour and power, according to their unequal dignitas (GKP: 54-
60, 187, 193, 254-5, 301: LGR: 43-5, 162, 232, 275). It was precisely because each 
man was entitled to receive his due that, as thinkers such as Aquinas and Giles 
argued, subjects should render their rulers the reverence and obedience which were 
their right: justice here meant obedience.31  
From Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic thought, medieval philosophers 
inherited the idea that nature provided a guide as to how human social, political and 
ethical life should be conducted.32 Within the Aristotelian tradition, nature itself was 
seen as working according to the concept of the rightful “mean”, so that nothing 
within it is marred by any excess or deficiency. Accordingly, since human ethics 
should follow nature, it followed that, as Aristotle himself had famously said, human 
virtue itself constituted a mean between two vices. Christine herself gave a stock 
instance of this when she followed Aristotle and Giles of Rome in defining liberality 
as the virtue which constitutes the mean between, on the one hand, the insufficiency 
of liberality that is avarice and, on the other, the excess of it which constitutes 
foolish prodigality (GKP: 42, 63, 68, 74, 193; LGR: 50, 55, 60, 166-7; BP: III: 5, 
23-4).33 More generally, this outlook could also be used in order to defend a social 
distribution of wealth, power and status that was unequal but which could still be 
presented as measured, proportionate and moderate. Indeed, even before the 
translation of Aristotle’s Ethics into Latin, John of Salisbury, who, as Nederman has 
emphasised, was familiar with Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean through the 
Organon, had argued in favour of social “equity” and against a “disproportionate” 
allocation of resources to any particular member of the body politic whilst 
simultaneously emphasising the need for hierarchy, inequality and deference within 
it.34 The reciprocity which should exist between the head and the body’s other 
members did not imply any strict or simple equality but rather meant that while 
superiors should “devote themselves” to those below them, inferiors should 
“respond likewise to the rights of their superiors” (Pol: V: 2 (p. 66); V: 7 (p. 76); VI: 
20 (p. 126)). Similarly, while Giles of Rome sought to justify the existence of 
private property and the need for inequality in the distribution of wealth, he did not 
seek to defend the limitless or disproportionate pursuit of individual riches. Instead 
he argued that each man should be rewarded with the wealth needed to maintain his 
rank or estate (GKP: 70, 76, 100, 252-4, 264-5, 271-3, 301-6, 311-5, 330; LGR: 55, 
61, 89, 232-3, 243-5, 249-51, 275-9, 285-90, 307; DRP: II, iii: xii).  
                                                
31 For references, see Rigby, Wisdom and Chivalry, p. 195-7. 
32 Plato, “Timaeus”, Timaeus and Critias, ed. H. D. P. Lee, London, Penguin, 1977, 28 (p. 40-1), 
29 (p. 42), 38 (p. 52), 42 (p. 58), 44 (p. 60-1), 47 (p. 65); Aristotle, De Anima (On the Soul), ed. 
H. Lawson-Tancred, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1986, III: 9 (p. 212); Moses Hadas, 
“Introduction”, The Stoic Philosophy of Seneca, ed. Moses Hadas, New York, Yale University 
Press, 1968, p. 21-4. 
33 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I, ix: 5; II, ii: 6; II, vi: 4, 5, 9; Aristotle, De Anima, III: 9 
(p. 212). 
34 Nederman, Medieval Aristotelianism and its Limits, I: 60, 63-7, 70-4. 
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Thus, while the idea that there is a “natural equilibrium within the body” and 
that no part of the body is entitled to a disproportionate allocation of society’s 
common resources has been seen as a late medieval innovation which “stretched” or 
“subverted” conventional social and political doctrines, this idea was actually quite 
compatible with – indeed, was explicitly linked to – the traditional, hierarchical and 
“head-orientated conception” of the body politic of writers such as John of Salisbury 
and Giles of Rome. After all, given the customary definition of justice as each man 
receiving his “due”, the belief that no-one could claim a disproportionate share of 
the common goods of the community was a virtual tautology. Similarly, the idea that 
no part of the body politic was “greater than the whole” was not a new idea in the 
later middle ages but had actually been one of the central features of the organic 
analogy from the very beginning.35 However, the fact that no part of the body could 
claim to be greater than the whole did not mean that no part of the body enjoyed a 
primacy within the whole: being against excessive inequality did not entail being in 
favour of egalitarianism. Since the purpose of ideology is usually to “have it both 
ways”, rather than being used to buttress a single point about the need for social and 
political inequality, the metaphor of the body was commonly invoked in order to 
illustrate a nuanced argument about how diversity within the body politic was 
compatible with unity and how reciprocity could be reconciled with hierarchy and 
subordination. 
Although, like John of Salisbury’s Policraticus, Christine’s Livre du corps de 
policie does not explicitly use the term “distributive justice”, it is precisely this 
principle which implicitly underlies the hierarchical social and political order which 
she, like John, saw as being necessary and rightful within the body politic. Thus, 
having set out the definition of justice as “a measure which renders to each man his 
due” (i.e., “son droit” or “ce qui lui appartient”), one which was familiar to late 
medieval thinkers not only from Aristotle and Cicero but also from Roman civil law 
and Christian theology, Christine follows John of Salisbury and Giles of Rome in 
arguing that this “due” is not necessarily an equal one when she argues that the 
prince himself receives “ce qui lui est deu” when he is obeyed and feared by his 
subjects. If, as Christine later claimed in her Livre de paix, “the role of Reason is to 
distribute all things equally”, so that the good are rewarded and the bad are 
punished, then, as the Livre du corps de policie makes clear, such “equity” itself 
demands that people’s rewards, in terms of their allocation of honour, authority and 
wealth from the common goods of the community, should themselves be unequal 
(BBP/LCP: I: 19; I: 21; I: 29; BP: I: 5; LFBM I: 63).36 More broadly, if no-one 
should be guilty of “extortion” or of “overcharging” for the services which they 
render to their fellows, each man is nonetheless entitled to receive that which is 
necessary to “live properly” in his own particular place within the social hierarchy. 
The prince should therefore exercise measure and moderation and receive only that 
which it is “reasonable to collect” from his subjects when he has a good cause, such 
as defending his country against external enemies, but should do so “without 
gnawing to the bone his poor commoners”. Developing here, as elsewhere, the 
metaphor of the ruler as a “good shepherd” to his subjects, Christine repeated the 
                                                
35 Nederman, “The Living Body Politic”, p. 21- 22, 24, 26; Nederman, “Body Politics”, p. 61. 
36 Forhan, The Political Theory of Christine de Pizan, p. 113, 121, 145. 
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words which Valerius Maximus attributed to the Emperor Tiberias: “the good 
shepherd shears his sheep only once a year; he does not fleece them all the time, nor 
skin them so that he draws blood” (BBP/LCP: I: 9-11; see also BP: III: 15).37 In the 
Livre de paix, Christine explicitly links this concept of social justice with the 
metaphor of the body politic, repeating a claim previously made by Gerson in Vivat 
Rex in arguing that when the prince, or anyone else, seeks to enrich himself at the 
expense of other people this is like one part of the body seeking “to draw to itself the 
blood, health and substance of its neighbouring limb”, thus causing the weakness 
and deterioration of the whole body (BP: III: 25).38 It is this notion of justice as each 
person receiving his or her rightful if unequal due which explains why, in the Livre 
de la cité des dames, Christine depicts the personified Justice carrying a measuring 
vessel (BCL/CD: I: 6) since, as she puts it in the Epistre Othea, in a maxim she 
ascribed to Aristotle on the basis of her source, Les fleurs de toutes vertus: “Justice 
is a measure that God has established on earth to limit all things” (EO: 208).39 As she 
says in her Livre de paix, “the wise man, who knows what goodness is, wants to 
have enough and no more, in order to do good” (BP: III: 25). 
That, for Christine, a just and equitable distribution of society’s goods would 
be achieved by taking into account each person’s particular – and unequal – social 
estate can be seen in her approving description of the “triumphs” granted to the 
generals of ancient Rome in which the victor was greeted by the citizens “dressed in 
rich robes, according to their rank” and in her advice to the prince to show his 
magnanimity by welcoming each man “according to his degree” (BBP/LCP: I: 29; 
BP: II: 13). Similarly, when a prince (or other powerful person) gives a gift to 
someone as a “reward for something well done”, the value of the gift should be in 
line with the merit which has occasioned it whereas when gifts are made from pure 
generosity on the part of the prince he can give “small ones to poor and indigent 
persons”, so that each person is rewarded “according to his rank”. Even the way that 
people speak should be related to their own social class (a “grand style is not fitting 
for everyone”) and to the status of the people whom they are addressing, with each 
person being addressed “according to their rank and station” (BBP/LCP: I: 14; BP: 
III: 29; III: 33). Christine’s Livre des trois vertus thus explicitly recognises that 
although all temporal wealth and social rank come to us from God, He “has not 
divided the wealth equally” or given equal honour to each social position. However, 
this does not at all mean that God’s distribution of wealth is “unjust”. Rather, by 
giving more to some than to others He has offered them the chance to show their 
virtue by providing charity to the poor while simultaneously giving the poor man the 
chance to be “crowned with the diadem of patience” in return for his “long 
suffering”. Accordingly, “there is nothing wrong with the princess or great lady 
amassing treasure of money from revenue or a pension provided that she receives it 
lawfully and without committing extortion”. While such a lady has a duty to be 
charitable, the Word of God does not require her to give “everything to the poor if 
                                                
37 For the ruler as good shepherd, see also LFBM I: 126, 242; BP: III: 15; MF: 4105-6; BDAC: I: 
III (p. 15); CLE: 5521; Gerson, “Pour la réforme du royaume”, p. 1138, 1160. 
38 Gerson, “Pour la réforme du royaume”, p. 1146, 1156. 
39 C. F. Bühler, “The Fleurs de toutes vertus and Christine de Pizan’s L’Epître Othéa”, PMLA, 
62, 1947, p. 32-44, at p. 43. 
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she does not wish to. She can legitimately keep it for the necessities of her rank and 
to pay servants” and for her expenses in giving gifts, buying provisions and repaying 
debts. If it is wrong for a princess or great lady to have “unnecessary or extravagant” 
clothing she can nonetheless be “richly adorned” in her dress, ornaments and jewels 
in accordance with “her station in life” and her revenues and can enjoy “a great 
court with courtiers and much ceremony” in line with the “position where God has 
placed her”, provided that she does not adopt “more magnificence than is 
reasonable”. Good “public order” requires that each person should be “satisfied with 
his social standing” so that duchesses do “not wear the gowns of queens, nor 
countesses those of duchesses, nor ordinary ladies those of countesses”. Likewise, 
explicitly invoking the “golden mean” as the “most civilized and the most pleasing 
course” of action, Christine followed Giles of Rome in arguing that since “each 
woman should wear such clothing as indicates her husband’s and her rank”, a 
townswoman should not “desire to dress above her station” and seek to dress like a 
noblewomen. The rank of merchants is “fine and good” in itself and so the women 
of this class should “wear their rightful clothing, each woman according to her 
position” (TCL: I: 7; I: 9; I: 10; I: 11; I: 18; II: 9; II: 11; III: 2; III: 3; LTV: I: 8; I: 
10; I: 12; I: 19; II: 9; II: 11; III: 2; III: 3 DRP: II, i: xxi; GKP: 203-5; LGR: 179-81). 
Given this outlook, Christine not only regarded dressing above one’s place in 
society as being wicked in itself but, more generally, saw it as symbolizing the 
broader disruption and breakdown of status distinctions, and the rejection by 
individuals of the place which they had been assigned within the divinely-ordained 
social hierarchy, which she presented as central to the moral and social disorder of 
her own day. 
Christine’s expectation that rank would be demonstrated by appearance and 
her equation of such social hierarchy with rightful order and justice is also evident in 
her description of Charles V’s magnificence in the Livre des fais et bonnes meurs 
and in the Livre de paix. Here, when the king rode out with his nobles, he is 
described as being set apart from the rest of his company by his royal array so that, 
despite the rich dress of his nobles and gentlemen and the “measure” of the king’s 
own clothing, everyone would still recognise which of them enjoyed a royal pre-
eminence. Similarly, when the king greeted the Emperor Charles IV on his visit to 
Paris in 1378, he made sure that, despite the honours which were lavished on his 
royal guest, the emperor did not ride on a white horse, as he was accustomed to do 
when he entered towns under his own power, in case this should be taken as a “signe 
de dominacion” within the kingdom of France (LFBM: I: 50-1; II: 97; see also BP: 
I: 8; III: 30).40 Thus, while praising Charles V’s humility, Christine also noted the 
splendour of his court, with its ceremonial and feasts, of his building works, and of 
his clothing and jewels, which included “the richest crown France had ever seen, 
which cost an extraordinary amount from the treasury”. But whereas in a tyrant such 
spending would have been based on the extortion and impoverishment of his 
subjects, Charles’s Solomonic glory, one unparalleled in a French king since the 
time of Charlemagne, was an expression of the king’s wisdom and led to the 
prosperity of the artisan and merchants from whom such works and luxury goods 
were commissioned (BP: I: 7; III: 27-8, 30). 
                                                
40 On the imperial visit, see F. Autrand, Charles V le Sage, Paris, Fayard, 1994, p. 779-805. 
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If it is the function of ideology to eternalise the social order in the realm of 
thought and to stress the essential harmony of the different groups which make up 
any particular society then, from John of Salisbury through to Christine de Pizan and 
beyond, the metaphor of the body and the conception of the “distributive justice” 
which supposedly existed between its unequal parts were ideal for conveying a view 
of the contemporary social and political order as being inevitable, natural and 
divinely ordained and as being constituted in the universal interests of all its 
members.41 In general, ideology works by investing positive but indeterminate 
abstractions, such as “justice” or “equality”, with an historically-specific and 
socially-loaded content. As a result, rather than deciding whether Christine’s 
political vision was “egalitarian” or not, it may be more useful, as we have 
attempted to do here, to examine the particular sense which she herself ascribed to 
the notion of “equality”. It would seem that Christine, like other political theorists in 
the Aristotelian tradition, did indeed believe that everyone had an equal right to 
receive his or her “due” – it was simply that this due, in terms of wealth, power and 
status, was itself a profoundly unequal one. 
 
Conclusion 
As we have seen, recent interpretations of Christine de Pizan’s political theory, 
and in particular of her use of the metaphor of the body politic, have often stressed its 
intellectual originality and its social inclusivity. Yet, when we examine the fundamental 
principles on which her work is based, Christine’s social and political outlook, with its 
stress on the need to reconcile co-operation and interdependence within the community 
with the existence of hierarchy and inequality, seems strikingly similar to that found in 
the writings of earlier thinkers, such as John of Salisbury and Giles of Rome, whom she 
took as her sources. In general, her political philosophy was in line with the orthodoxy 
of medieval Aristotelianism and, indeed, at times, embodied a particularly hierarchical 
understanding of that tradition. Thus, the fact that some scholars may have denied any 
novelty to Christine’s work on the basis of political motives of which we may not 
approve does not mean that we should go to the opposite extreme and lay claim to an 
originality for her work where it does not actually exist.42 After all, Christine’s aim in 
writing a work such as the Livre du corps de policie during the years 1404-7 – when 
France was on the brink of civil war – was neither to demonstrate her intellectual 
ingenuity nor to claim a place for herself in the canon of political philosophy but 
rather to make a practical intervention in a time of profound political crisis. 
However, a recognition of how much Christine’s political outlook owed to 
the work of earlier theorists, does not entail a denial of all originality to her political 
writings. Firstly, the obvious exception to Christine’s agreement with previous 
authorities was her defence of female virtue, rationality and prudence and of women’s 
ability to participate in political life. Even though she did not conclude that women’s 
                                                
41 For references on ideology, see S. H. Rigby, English Society in the Later Middle Ages: 
Class, Status and Gender, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1995, p. 303-10. 
42 Carroll, “On the Causes of War and the Quest for Peace”, p. 340-1; Carroll, “Christine de Pizan 
and the Origins of Peace Theory”, p. 23. See also C. Gauvard, “Christine de Pisan: a-t-elle eu une 
pensée politique? A propos d’ouvrages récents”, Revue Historique, 250, 1973, p. 417-30, at 
p. 417-20. 
Stephen H. RIGBY 
 
578 
intelligence required them to play an equal part in public life with men, she did express 
in theoretical terms a defence of the political role which medieval women already 
enjoyed in practice, a role which her contemporary, male theorists systematically 
neglected. Secondly, where the content of Christine’s political philosophy was often 
most innovative was not in its basic principles but rather in its application of these 
principles to particular situations, this ability to put wisdom into practice being 
Aristotle’s – and Christine’s – own definition of prudence (LFBM II: 21).43 For 
instance, while, as we have seen, it was a commonplace of medieval political theory 
that kings should be learned, Christine was able to demonstrate the intellectual and 
practical wisdom of Charles V in her biography of the king in a very specific way 
when she praised his commissioning of translations of the Bible along with works 
by Augustine, Aristotle, John of Salisbury and many others (LFBM II: 42-4). In this 
sense, Christine’s originality in her Livre des fais et bonnes meurs lay not in its 
underlying principles but rather in its conversion of the detail of Charles V’s actions 
into exempla to be used as a model for his successors and in expressing his political 
practice in a systematic form and within a general theoretical framework. As a 
result, Christine did not so much “transform” her sources, such as the Policraticus or 
Giles’s De regimine principum, as creatively apply their ideas to particular 
situations.44 
Finally, the originality of Christine’s output is often to be found not so much 
in her basic political ideas but rather in its use of fresh imagery so as to de-
familiarise what were in fact commonplace ideas in order to present them to her 
readers afresh. As Kennedy has argued, Christine’s works of political philosophy are 
both didactic treatises and works of artistic creation. Seen in this perspective, much 
of their inventiveness lay not in their political content but rather in the artistry of the 
form in which this content was expressed. Thus, even though the Livre du corps de 
policie invokes the conventional analogy of the state with the human body, it then 
proceeds to do something new with this extremely familiar raw material by turning the 
idea of the “body politic” into the unifying image of the entire book – being the first 
work of medieval political theory to do so – and by linking it to a whole series of 
related metaphors of health and sickness, growth and decay, and balance and 
imbalance.45 
As Delany pointed out, modern scholars have often been unwilling to admit that 
their own favoured authors from the past – with Christine de Pizan being a prime 
example – may have held opinions which seem unpalatable to modern audiences.46 
                                                
43 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI, vii: 6-7. 
44 D. Delogu, “Christine de Pizan lectrice de Gilles de Rome: Le De regimine principum et Le 
livre des fais et bonnes meurs du sage roy Charles V”, Cahiers de Recherches Médiévales et 
Humanistes, 16, 2008, p. 213-24. 
45 Kennedy, “The Image of the Body Politic in Christine de Pizan’s Livre du corps de policie”, 
p. 18-27. 
46 S. Delany, “History, Politics and Christine Studies: A Polemical Reply”, Politics, Gender and 
Genre, ed. Brabant, p. 193-206, at p. 196, 198. It should be stressed that recognizing that the 
views expressed by medieval authors were often alien to our own does not mean that it is our task, 
as academics, to denounce such thinkers for having failed to anticipate our own moral or political 
outlook. 
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Here, by contrast, it has been argued that, disappointing though it may be to us as 
modern readers, the political theory of Christine de Pizan should not be understood as 
subverting the traditional connotations of the idea of the body politic. Rather, her 
political theory was profoundly hierarchical rather than egalitarian, with the Aristotelian 
notion of “distributive justice” allowing her to reconcile a conception of the members of 
the body as being involved in a reciprocal and “equitable” relationship with one which 
emphasised the inevitability, necessity and benefits to all of social and political 
inequality. There were, as we saw in Part I of this article, medieval political theorists 
such as Ptolemy of Lucca and Marsilius of Padua whose work, in developing an 
“ascending” notion of political authority in which the ruler was responsible to, 
constrained by, and even chosen by the political community, does provide a contrast 
with the focus on the need for hierarchical subordination of the members of the body 
politic to its monarchical head which was found in the political philosophy of a John of 
Salisbury or a Giles of Rome. However, Christine de Pizan, with her emphasis on the 
desirability of royal government, on the dangers of rule by the many, and on the need 
for hierarchy and inequality within the social and political order, should not be included 
amongst their number. 
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